In recent years, a variety of issues have emerged that have caused public disquiet about the credibility of British government advice on public health': Regrettably, in early 1996, events demonstrated just how widespread this was. The events following the release of information that bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a possible cause of 10 cases of Creutzfeldt.-jakob disease (CJD)2 have engendered a serious loss of confidence in the government. Indeed, some government pronouncements on public health issues are now regarded with disbelief not only by large sections of the British public' but also by public health experts and governments worldwide't-'. International cooperation is needed in many strategies for promoting public health, yet the British government's handling of the BSE crisis meant that the country most affected, the UK, found itself isolated and in de facto quarantine.
The scale of the crisis facing British agriculture should ensure that, at last, adequate resources for a broad-based research and surveillance strategy on the issue will be made available. For government officials to engage in whispering campaigns, or worse, to try to discredit those scientists whose views are seen as 'unhelpful' or 'politically suspect' 6 , should no longer be possible. However, while accelerated activity to aid understanding of the nature of BSE and the mooted BSE-CJD species jump is of the highest priority, this should be accompanied by the equally important identification of policy lessons that can be learnt.
POLICY FAILURES
There have been at least three major policy-related failures. The first stems from the culture of government in Britain which has tended to follow a deregulatory approach. Some critics, particularly opposition politicians, have argued that Britain's exceptionally high rate of BSE-over 160 000 cases in the UK compared with 356 cases elsewhere/-c-has been exacerbated by deregulation of the feedstuffs industry. recycling of sheep remains to cattle-feed until introduced following the Southwood Report in 1989 8 . However, as Southwood noted, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution had expressed concern about this practice in 1979 and its caution was ignored 9 . It is here that the nature of deregulation has a case to answer. It is one matter to remove (or flout) existing regulations; it is another not to introduce them when there are grounds for doing so. There are sins of omission and commission. Since the early 1980s, the government has stated a desire to take the burden off industry. Food policy-always a balancing act. between competing interests 10, II-has long been recognized as unduly driven by industryI2,13, and not only the farmers!", It is this culture that urgently needs to be scrutinized.
The case of BSE demonstrates why this policy is fundamentally flawed. No one will deny that the government acted on BSE; the issue is whether it did enough at the right time, or did it act only on an optimistic scenario, rather than a pessimistic one. Even the farmerfriendly Commons Agriculture Committee, in its 1990 report on BSE, argued that ministers should go beyond scientific advice 'whether for political, commercial or other reasons' 15. Others asked for rapid development of a test to enable random testing and certification to ensure consumer confidenceI6. Regulations that seek to protect the health of the public are usually put in place for a good reason and need to be monitored and updated. Threats to health do change and it is reasonable for regulations to reflect this. What is not justifiable is for regulations to be swept aside or delayed if the reasons for them remain or emerge.
BSE is just an extreme example of the adverse consequences of deregulation that have been seen in other areas, many of which have implications for the wider determinants of health. These include deregulation of bus services that has led to a substantial decrease in access to public transport in rural areas17, deregulation of the milk supply with a reduction in home deliveries and increased prices 18, refusal to regulate the private security industry despite calls to do so from the industry, the Home Office, and the Commons Home Affairs Committee (in the light of evidence that convicted murderers and rapists are being employedl"), and refusal adequately to regulate the pensions industry/". Even when problems are already obvious, ministers are willing to pursue further deregulation, as shown by the confirmation by ministers, only a day after the European Union veterinary committee had proposed a worldwide ban on export of British beef, that regulations concerning food hygiene would be relaxed further?". Of course, such problems are not confined to Britain. The American government, under President Reagan, pursued similar deregulatory policies, which led to the Savings and Loan scandals of the 1980s 22.
The main justification for deregulation is, of course, economic. It is intended to reduce costs to business and government. This assumption has now been challenged by the evidence that the cost of eliminating BSE from herds in Ireland, where a much more active approach was adopted, was only £4.5 million, compared with the postulated cost of restoring confidence in the British beef industry of between £0.5 billion per year for 5 years and £20 billion in total, in direct costs, with major additional burdens on other industries. The high cost of failure to regulate is also illustrated by the case of pesticide contamination of water, where the bill in Scotland alone is estimated to be £4-5 billion and in the whole of the UK, £29 billion.".
Unfortunately, matters could easily get much worse. The 1994 Deregulation and Contracting Out Act permits the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to repeal primary legislation relating to business regulation without seeking the approval of Parliament. Consequently, what little scrutiny did exist has now been dispensed with/". There must also be great concern for the health of the public following leaked memos about safety on the railways, in nuclear power stations and in the water industry. In each case, the government has slackened safety regulations to encourage private investment. This situation is compounded by the failure adequately to fund those bodies, such as the Health and Safety Executive, which have responsibility for monitoring the regulations that remain and, in some cases, for the government to encourage industry to flout those regulations that do exist, even though their own legal experts have warned them of the illegality of doing s025.
The second failure was the way in which the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) worked and, in particular, the absence of specialist public health scientists on the committee until late 1995 26. The traditional method of assessing scientific evidence, in which judgments are made only on the basis of what has already happened, are no more appropriate in public health than they are in aircraft deSign. Would it be acceptable to test a new aircraft by waiting to see if it crashes? Instead, there is a need for scenario planning, as is done by, for example, the Dutch government. This involves -drawing on analogy, regularly asking 'what if?', and modelling the consequences of best and worst case scenarios which can be adapted as additional information becomes available/". Had they done so they might have placed less faith in the species barrier, given that very many common human diseases originated in anirnals-". It might also have led the committee to question the official government line that precautions, because they had been announced, would automatically be implemented, in view of the extensive evidence from investigative journalists to the contrary.. Indeed, last year, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) itself found, in two series of spot checks on abattoirs, that in one 48% (92 of 193 inspected) and in the other 34% (52 of 153 inspected) were breaking the Specified Bovine Offals Order 1995, which contains the regulations covering removal of spinal tissue and offa]29. They could also have questioned, simply on grounds of common sense, quite how it is possible to saw through the entire length of a spinal cord without contaminating surrounding meat. There was also a failure to understand the complexity of how people perceive risk. A patronizing attitude was typified in a statement by the Secretary of State for Health that it is the public who are mad rather than the cows 30. There is a need to be honest when there is genuine uncertainty. This presumption of knowledge persists, as the argument that calves are safe to eat rests on the scarcely credible idea that there is no pre-symptomatic infective period.
The third failure relates to the close relationship between government and industry in Britain. In a sensitive policy area such as food, government has to balance a variety of interests. The continued existence of a body seeking, in theory, to reconcile the often competing interests of farmers, manufacturers, retailers and consumers is no longer tenable. In particular, it is important to separate business sponsorship from regulation. MAFF too often gives the impression that commercial interests come first. Despite pressure, MAFF continues, quite unjustifiably, to resist proposals to establish an independent Food Standards Agency that could act more effectively on the public's behalf3 1 • Other industrialized economies have pioneered other models. The USA has a separate Food and Drugs Administration and others such as Sweden and Australia have national food authorities.
LESSONS TO BE LEARNT
So what should be done? The policy of deregulation and 'hands-off government is now discredited and has, ironically, devastated the very industries it was supposed to support. The 1994 Act should be repealed and changes to regulations in relevant areas, such as food, transport, health, and the environment should be subject to a public health impact assessment. This would simply reflect the government's stated commitment to the Health of the Nation strat egy32.
Bodies advising on areas of public health importance should have a public health input; and basic scientists advising on policy should have some knowledge of epidemiological concepts and methods and policy theory. This has academic and political implications. There have been many other instances in which a reductionist approach, based on partial evidence, has led to incorrect advice such as the recommendation by paediatricians until the mid 1980s that infants should be placed to sleep face down 35 . Politically, there is a need to re-establish trust in the independence of the advice given to ministers and to reassure the public that scientists will not be excluded simply because their views are controversial. At present the changed role of regional directors of public health " and the growing climate of fear in the National Health Service and Public Health Laboratory Service makes individuals reluctant to speak out 35 . Consumers must also no longer be treated as optional extras in food policy. It is good that consumer representatives now sit on committees such as the Food Advisory Committee and Committee on Toxicity, but the Consumer Panel and the quarterly meetings of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food with chairs of consumer organizations are now shown to be peripheral. They were not even consulted in the first few weeks of the BSE crisis. It is now essential that SEAC should contain consumer representatives.
Finally, the potentially conflicting functions of MAFF must be separated. There is a need for a national coordinating Food Policy Council to articulate food policy goals that reflect the health, consumer, production, environmental and welfare aspects of food policy. There are many other emerging issues, such as pesticide residues in fruit and vegetables, where consumer opinion will demand a source of independent advice. Labelling is unequal to this task and already contradictory. Out of this sorry saga some good could come, but only if outside voices combine to demand reform of our national food policy. Intensive food and farming has cut costs, but also corners. On public health grounds this cannot continue.
